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FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING TRAFFIC IN MARIJUANA
-THE GRASS IS STILL GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE
Petitioner attempted to enter Mexico but was refused admittance
at the Mexican end of the Laredo International Bridge. Upon his return
to the United States he was arrested by American customs officials and
charged with failure to comply with transfer tax provisions of the Fed-
eral Marijuana Tax Act,' and with facilitating the transportation and
concealment of marijuana in violation of the Narcotic Drugs Import and
Export Act.2 Petitioner contended that the transfer tax provision was a
violation of his privilege against self-incrimination and that he was denied
due process of law by the statutory presumption which equated mere
possession of marijuana with knowledge of its illegal importation. The
United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, found the de-
fendant guilty on both counts and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
affirmed.3 On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, held,
reversed: the transfer tax provisions of the Marijuana Tax Act subjected
petitioner to a real and appreciable danger of prosecution under state
statutes and was thus violative of Fifth Amendment protections. The
presumed knowledge of illegal importation was an unconstitutional en-
croachment upon petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment right to due pro-
cess, since there was no rational connection between the basic fact of
possession and the presumed knowledge of illegal importation. Leary v.
United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
In previous cases dealing with the payment of the marijuana transfer
tax, no violation of Fifth Amendment rights was found.4 The Supreme
Court's decision in Marchetti v. United States,' however, forced an op-
posite result. The defendant in Marchetti was convicted of wilful failure
to pay the federal occupational tax on gambling.' The Supreme Court
held that a plea of the Fifth Amendment was a complete defense and that
1. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4741-74 (1964).
2. 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1964).
3. 388 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), petition for rehearing denied, 392 F.2d 220 (5th Cir.
1968).
4. Some courts reasoned that if the marijuana, purchased in Mexico, had been invoiced
at the border it would have been confiscated. Therefore, there would have been no illegal
possession within the United States, and no self-incrimination. Rule v. United States, 362
F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1018 (1967) ; Arrizon v. United States, 224
F. Supp. 26 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Pickett v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
One court reasoned that the scheme to require persons to fill out marijuana transfer
forms required no self incrimination because it referred only to future acts not yet criminal.
Haifi v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 656 (D. Hawaii 1962).
5. 390 U.S. 39 (1968). Marchetti was handed down with two other decisions: Grosso v.
United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), and Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). Grosso
held that the privilege against self-incrimination would be a defense to prosecution under
26 U.S.C. § 4401 (1964), which imposes an excise tax on wagers. Haynes held that the
privilege would be a defense to a prosecution for possession of an unregistered weapon
under § 5851 of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-62 (1964).
6. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4411-12 (1964).
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compliance with the statute would have subjected petitioner to a "real
and appreciable" risk of self-incrimination.7 In order for there to be such
a risk, the Court held that the taxing legislation must have been "directed
to a selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities" and that it
must not have been imposed in "an essentially non-criminal and regula-
tory area.'' s
Possession of any quantity of marijuana is a crime in all fifty statesY
Compliance with the federal tax requirements 0 would thus amount to
at least an admission of the intent to commit a crime under state law,
since the information on the order form is made available to state law
enforcement officials."1
According to its terms, then, the Marijuana Tax Act compels a trans-
feree to expose himself to a "real and appreciable risk of self-incrim-
ination," as in the Marchetti case. This is true even when the Act is read
with supporting regulations which ostensibly provide that no person will
be permitted to register as a "dealer' ' x- unless his activities give him the
legal right to do so,' 3 and that no one may obtain an order form unless
so registered. 4 The reason the Court allowed this apparent anomaly is
that the wording of the statute indicates that Congress intended for non-
registrants to be able to obtain order forms and pay the tax.'5 Thus the act
7. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968).
8. Id. at 57.
9. All states except California, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania have enacted the Uni-
form Narcotic Drug Act or some slight variation thereof. The prohibitory language of that
Act makes it "unlawful for any person to manufacture, possess, have under his control, sell,
prescribe, administer, dispense or compound any narcotic drug . . . [defined to include
marijuana]." UNrFoRM NARconc DRUG ACT § 2.
While California, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania have not adopted the Uniform Act,
they have adopted provisions substantially similar in effect. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE
§ 11530 (Deering 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 708-04 (1964); MASS. GEN. LUAWS ANN.
ch. 94, § 198 (1958).
10. 26 U.S.C. § 4742 (a) (1964) makes it unlawful for any person to transfer marijuana
except pursuant to a written order form obtained by the transferee.
26 U.S.C. § 4744 (a) (1964) makes it unlawful for any person who is a transferee re-
quired to pay the transfer tax imposed by § 4741 to acquire, transport, conceal, or facili-
tate the transportation or concealment of any marijuana without having paid such tax.
Only a few types of transfers are exempted from the tax. They include: transfer from
a registered physician or from a dealer pursuant to a written prescription; exportation in
accordance with the regulations of the country to which the marijuana is to be exported;
transfers to federal and state officials making purchases for the Department of Defense, the
Public Health Service or certain hospitals or prisons; transfers of seeds to any person reg-
istered under § 4753; and transfers from persons registered under § 4753 to a registered
miller.
11. 26 U.S.C. § 4773 (1964) assures that the information contained in the order form
will be available to state narcotics officials upon payment of a nominal fee.
12. 26 U.S.C. § 4751 (1964) provides that all persons who "deal in" marijuana shall
be subject to an annual occupational tax.
13. 26 C.F.R. §§ 152.22- .23 (1964) provide that an applicant must show he is en-
titled to registration under 26 U.S.C. § 4751 (1964).
14. 26 C.F.R. § 152.67 (1964) provides that an application for order forms under §
4742 must be signed by the same person who signed the application for registration or by
a person duly authorized by the registrant.
15. 26 U.S.C. § 4741 (1964) provides for a transfer tax of $100 per ounce to non-regis-
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does not qualify as being "essentially non-criminal and regulatory" in
nature.
Since those who may legally possess marijuana are virtually certain
either to be registered or exempt from registration, the class of possessors
both unregistered and obliged to obtain an order form constitutes a "select
group inherently suspect of criminal activities."16
With both criteria set forth by Marchetti apparently satisfied, the
Court found itself unable to redeem the transfer tax provisions of the
Marijuana Tax Act as constitutional. There are indications however, that
if the element of "select group" was missing, or if the tax was imposed
in an essentially non-criminal and regulatory area, the result would be
quite different.
In United States v. Minor, 7 the defendant raised the privilege
against self-incrimination as a defense to prosecution for selling narcotic
drugs without the mandatory order form which is required by 26 United
States Code section 4705(a) (1964). In affirming the defendant's con-
viction, the court concluded that section 4705(a) was not directed pri-
marily at those inherently suspect of criminal activities, and that the
provisions of section 4705(a) were primarily regulatory in nature (i.e.
non-criminal) .18
It would thus appear that where the element of "select group" was
absent or the legislation was essentially non-criminal and regulatory, the
court would be compelled to find no danger of self-incrimination. We turn
now to the question of whether the statutory presumption contained in 21
United States Code section 176(a) (1964) is a denial of due process of
law. 9
Prior to its decision in Tot v. United States, 20 the Supreme Court
set forth a number of different standards against which to measure such
presumptions.2' The defendant in Tot was convicted of a violation of the
trants. Section 4742 makes it unlawful for an person, whether or not required to pay a special
tax and register, to transfer marijuana except pursuant to written order forms.
16. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968).
17. 398 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1968).
18. Id. at 516.
19. Insofar as is here relevant, 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1964) imposes criminal punishment
upon every person who:
knowingly, with intent to defraud the United States, imports or brings into the
United States marihuana contrary to law ...or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or
in any manner facilitates that transportation, concealment or sale of such marihuana
after being imported or brought in, knowing the same to have been imported or
brought into the United States contrary to law ....
A subsequent paragraph establishes the presumption now under scrutiny:
Whenever on trial for a violation of this subsection, the defendant is shown to have
or to have had the marihuana in his possession such possession shall be deemed
sufficient evidence to authorize conviction . . . . (Emphasis added.)
20. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
21. One test was whether there was a "rational connection" between the basic fact and
the presumed fact. Western and Atlantic R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929); McFar-
land v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916); Mobile J. & K.C. R.R. v. Turnip-
seed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910). A second test was whether the legislature might have made it a
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Federal Firearms Act,22 which made it unlawful for one previously con-
victed of a violent crime to receive a firearm shipped in interstate com-
merce. The presumption contained in section 902 (f) of the Act, and found
unconstitutional in Tot, provides that:
the possession of a firearm or ammunition by any such person
shall be presumptive evidence that such firearm or ammunition
was shipped or transported or received, as the case may be, by
such person in violation of this Act.23
In deciding Tot, the Court put an apparent end to the "choice of
alternative" test. The "rational connection" test24 was established as
controlling, with the "comparative convenience" test 5 as its corollary.
This rule has been followed in the two subsequent cases in which the
issue was presented.26
The upshot of Tot and its successors is:
that a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as
"irrational" or "arbitrary," and hence unconstitutional unless
it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the pre-
sumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact
on which it is made to depend. [I.e. the fact of knowledge of
illegal importation must flow from the fact of possession.]
7
The Court in the instant case therefore concluded that it could not uphold
the presumption of petitioner's knowledge of illegal importation of
marijuana without making "serious incisions" on the teaching of Tot and
its progeny.
28
This writer believes the Court was correct in its determination. 9
crime to do the thing from which the presumption authorized an inference. Ferry v. Ram-
sey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928). A third test involved the "comparative convenience" of adducing
evidence of the presumed fact (i.e. whether it would be more convenient for the defendant
or for the prosecution to adduce such evidence). Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
Cf. Rossi v. United States, 289 U.S. 89 (1933); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178
(1925).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 901-09 (1964).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1964).
24. Note 21 supra.
25. Note 21 supra.
26. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S.
136 (1965).
27. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, - (1969).
28. Id. at -.
29. An examination of the lower court decisions regarding the constitutionality of the
presumption does not suggest the contrary. Although all courts of appeal which have ruled
on the question have sustained the presumption, there is no indication that in any of the
cases the court had before it even a fraction of the evidence regarding knowledge of illegal
importation which the Supreme Court considered in the instant case. Caudillo v. United
States, 253 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1958); Costello v. United States, 324 F.2d 260 (9th Cir.
1963); United States v. Soto, 256 F.2d 729 (7th Cir. 1958); Born v. United States, 332
F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Gibson, 310 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1962).
The only lower court which conducted an extensive factual inquiry into the validity
of the presumption also held it unconstitutional. United States v. Adams, 293 F. Supp. 776
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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Insistence upon the rational connection criteria provides the accused
some protection against the temptation of prosecutors to initiate litigation
based on insufficient evidence, using the presumption as a crutch. It also
assures that Congress will not abrogate the accused's right to a jury
trial by dictating to the judge and jury what evidence is sufficient for
conviction, without sufficient factual basis for such determination. In
the words of Mr. Justice Black:
Congress has no more constitutional power to tell a jury it can
convict upon any such forced and baseless inference then it has
power to tell juries they can convict a defendant of a crime
without any evidence at all from which an inference of guilt
could be drawn.3
0
The impact of the principal case on the question of statutory pre-
sumptions will be relatively slight, since Leary is merely further re-af-
firmation of the Tot doctrine. However, the impact on the question of
narcotics transfer taxes as an infringement of the right against self in-
crimination remains to be seen.
In United States v. Minor,8 the Second Circuit indicated that the
self-incrimination privilege was not available as a defense to prosecution
under section 4705 (a) of the Narcotics Tax Act 2 on the theory that the
tax was not directed at an inherently suspect group, and was essentially
regulatory in nature. This decision appears to give Congress an easy way
of avoiding the entire issue of self-incrimination presented by Leary,
by merely including marijuana as a narcotic under the Narcotics Tax Act.
This writer subscribes to Mr. Justice Stewart's philosophy on the
matter of the privilege against self-incrimination; that "the fifth amend-
ment guarantee against compulsory self incrimination was originally
intended to do no more than confer a testimonial privilege in a judicial
proceeding."33 However, until some future date when, and if, the Court
decides to re-evaluate its decisions in this area, the weight of precedent
soundly supports the decision in the principal case..
GARY D. KATZ
30. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, - (1969) (concurring opinion).
31. 398 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1968).
32. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4701-24 (1964) makes it illegal to possess narcotic drugs unless the
possessor has registered and paid the prescribed tax, or is exempt from such registration
(§ 4724 c).
33. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, - (1969) (concurring opinion).
